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I. INTRODUCTION

Americans derive income from three major sources after retirement:
individual assets accumulated over their working life (i.e. savings and
investments), social security, and employment-based pension plans.'
Although it may appear less effective for the federal government to change
the individual habit of saving for retirement, especially on a national scale,
the government has made significant efforts to improve the social security
system and private pension plans through extensive legislation. Social
security is a mandatory, federally administered system, designed to provide
people with basic financial support in retirement and to reduce poverty
among seniors.2 In contrast, the government allows employers to choose
whether to offer pension plans to their employees, and promotes their use
through preferential tax treatments for employees who participate in private
pension plans.3
"Retirement security has become a national priority." 4 The United
States population aged during the 20th century, partially because the
population of citizens aged 65 years and older grew at a far greater rate
than did the total population. 5 During that time those within the 65-74 age
t J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Pennsylvania Law School, B.A. 1997, Peking
University. The author would like to thank Professor Reed Shuldiner of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School for his advice on the paper, as well as the editors of the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law for their encouragement
and help.
1. JAY CONISON, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN A NUTSHELL 36-37 (2d ed. 1998).
2. Id. at 37.
3. Id. at 38-39.
4. DEP'T OF LABOR, 2002 NATIONAL SUMMIT ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS: DELEGATE
RESOURCES 5 (Mar.2002), availableat http://www.doL gov/ebsa/PDF/SummitBackFinal.pdf.
5. FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN
THE 20TH CENTURY, 58 (Nov. 2002), at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf

(noting that the United States' total population more than tripled during the 20th century,
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group made up the majority of the elderly.6 Meanwhile, the work force in
the United States has also been aging. The "baby-boom generation" (those
born between 1946 and 1964) 7 is fifty percent larger than the generation it
supports through Social Security, while the post-1964 "baby-bust"
generation is significantly smaller than the generation that it will eventually
be responsible for. s Therefore, Social Security funding will likely be
insufficient to provide a satisfactory living standard for retiring baby
boomers.
With both an aging population and an aging workforce, society is
paying greater attention to federal pension policies. Further efforts to save
for retirement through the mandatory Social Security system or through tax
incentives for individuals who accumulate personal assets are unlikely to
produce the desired improvements in retirement security, whereas more
saving efforts may be encouraged at the private employment level. The
federal tax laws have traditionally been the major source of incentives for
the sponsorship of employment-based pension plans, and pension system
reforms are often achieved through tax legislation. 9
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA)' ° started a new round of pension reform. The Act provides
substantial tax benefits by using the federal budget surplus to subsidize the
private pension system and to encourage private employers to sponsor new
employee pension plans. Meanwhile, the recent financial collapse of the
Enron Corporation and the financial losses suffered by participants in
Enron's retirement plans sounded the alarm to all regarding the
vulnerabilities of the private pension saving mechanisms." Tax benefits
alone will not be enough to ensure pension security. 12
and that the population of those 65 and over increased more than tenfold).
6. Id.
7. See generally DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note, 4 at 3 (reciting a history of retirement
security and income legislation).
8. See, e.g., American Academy of Actuaries, Policy Monograph 1998 No. 1,
Financing the Retirement of Future Generations: The Problems and Options for Change, 6
(1998), available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/retirement.pdf (discussing the
effects of post-World War II population growth on the Social Security system).
9. See DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 4, at 5 (detailing the history of retirement security
and income legislation).
10. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38 (enacted June 7, 2001) (hereinafter EGTRRA).
11. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the
Senate Finance Committee, Private Pensions: Key Issues to Consider Following the Enron
Collapse (Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02480t.pdf at I
("The financial losses suffered by participants in Enron's retirement plans have raised
questions about the benefits and limitations of such private pension and savings plans and
the challenges employees face in saving for retirement through their employer-provided
plans.")
12. In his State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush called on Congress to
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What should be the future of the private retirement system in 21st
century America? How far has EGTRRA gone to address the problems in
the pension systems and to promote retirement security for the elderly?
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the pension reform provisions
under EGTRRA against the various reform proposals of the private pension
system, and to explore areas of further improvement that can better achieve
the social policy objective of providing "retirement benefits to a broad
group of employees."13

Part II provides an overview of the current employment-based private
pension system in the United States. Part III examines the major problems
of the private pension system. Part IV outlines some major changes to
pension regulations made by EGTRRA and evaluates the likely effect of
EGTRRA on the problems of the private pension system. Part V
introduces some pension reform proposals. Part VI concludes the comment
by proposing a general direction for future reforms of the private pension
system on the basis of selected proposals related to the various aspects of
pension reform.
II.

EMPLOYMENT-BASED PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES

A.

EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLANS
Most private sector pension plans are covered by ERISA, which

provides protections for plan participants and beneficiaries and specifies4
standards of fiduciary responsibilities for those who manage plans.1
ERISA does not require an employer to provide a pension plan for its
employees. Instead, it sets certain minimum standards and requirements
that an offered plan must meet. 5 The Internal Revenue Code ("the Code")
and ERISA are the "stick and carrot" in the regulation of pension plans.
That is, where ERISA curbs the mismanagement of pension plans, the
Code provides favorable tax treatments to qualified retirement plans in
order to encourage the sponsorship of plans in a way that would be
enact important new safeguards to protect the pensions of millions of American workers: "A
good job should lead to security in retirement. I ask Congress to enact new safeguards for
401(k) and pension plans. Employees who have worked hard and saved all their lives should
not have to risk losing everything if their company fails." President George W. Bush, State
of
the
Union
Address
(Jan.
29,
2002)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/media/press/pr012902.htm).
13. H.R. REP. No. 107-1836, T 5039 (2001).
14. JAMES 0. CASTAGNERA &
BENEFITS 37 (1992).

15. Id. at 38.

DAVID A.

LITrELL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE
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beneficial to participating employees. 16 To qualify for the associated tax
benefits, a retirement plan must satisfy the rules and requirements under the
Code, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),"7
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 18 A nonqualified plan is not entitled to the tax advantages offered to a qualified
plan.
The tax benefits for a qualified retirement plan under the Code include
immediate deduction of contributions by the employer (even though they
may not be included in a participant's income), 19 earnings accumulation on
a tax deferred basis, 2° and potentially favorable tax treatment for the
participants when they receive distribution." The federal government's
greatest tax expenditure has been pension-related preferential tax
22
treatment.
ERISA covers two major types of qualified pension plans: defined
benefit plans23 and defined contribution plans.24 In recent years, a number
of hybrid plans with some characteristics of both have emerged.
1. Defined Benefit Plans.
A defined benefit plan provides participants with determinable
retirement benefits over a period of years, usually for life.21 Under a
defined benefit plan, an employer promises to pay a specific amount
through a trust fund while making contributions to that fund.26 Such a plan
maintains no individual accounts and pays benefits according to a formula;
hence the employer bears the investment risk.27 Traditional defined benefit

16. Id. at 50.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2002).
18. See id. § 621 (2001).
19. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1), (3) (2002).
20. Id. §§ 401(a), 501(a).
21. Id. § 402(a).
22. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that employer-provided retirement
plans cost the federal government $87.9 billion in foregone revenues for fiscal year 2002.
Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of FederalTax Expendituresfor Fiscal Years 20022006 (Jan. 17, 2002).
23. See Pamela C. Scott, Qualified Defined Benefit Plans: The Essentials,502 PRAC. L.
INST. - TAX L. & PRAC. 23 (2001) (discussing various types defined benefit plans).
24. See generally, Leonard S. Hirsh, Plan Qualification Requirements, 502 PRAC. L.
INST. - TAX L. & PRAC. 9 (2001) (discussing defined benefit plans and defined contribution
plans).
25. Id. at 18.
26. Scott, supra note 23, at 31.
27. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining that the employer is
responsible for a funding deficiency at the time of distribution and must pay premiums to
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") to insure against any loss of benefits.)
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plans include: the flat benefit plan,28 the unit benefit plan,
equity plan.3 °

and the pension

2. Defined Contribution Plans
A defined contribution plan distributes the accumulated contributions
and earnings allocated to the participant's individual account upon
retirement.3' Under this type of plan, the employee bears the investment
risk.12 The most common types of defined contribution plans are: profit
sharing plans,33 401(k) plans (or cash or deferred arrangements),34 money
purchase pension plans,35 target benefit plans, 3 6 stock bonus plans, 37 and

28. A fiat benefit plan is based on a flat dollar amount or a flat percentage of
compensation for life. Scott, supra note 23, at 32.
29. A more common type of defined benefit plan is the unit benefit plan. Under a unit
benefit plan, the participant receives credit for a specific unit of benefit (i.e., a percentage of
pay or a flat dollar amount) for each year of service. Typically, in a final average pay unit
benefit plan, the benefit is based on average pay immediately prior to retirement-usually
the last three or five years. Id. at 32-33. For example, a plan might provide that a worker's
annual retirement benefit is equal to two percent of the number of years of service times
final average compensation. Id.
30. A pension equity plan is a defined benefit plan that expresses an employee's benefit
as a lump sum based on the employee's final average salary times a percentage per year of
service. For example, a lump sum equal to ten percent of the employee's final average pays
times the number of per years of service. Id. at 36.
31. See CONISON, supra note 1, at 4 (introducing defined contribution plans).
32. Hirsh, supra note 24, at 18.
33. A profit sharing plan is the most common form of defined contribution plan. Id. at
18. Contributions to the plan are generally at the discretion of the employer's board of
directors. This allows employers great flexibility because no commitment is required in
unprofitable years, and contributions are allocated among participating employers in
proportion to salaries for the year in question. David A. Pratt, Symposium: Nor Rhyme Nor
Reason: Simplifying Defined ContributionPlans, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 741, 762 (2001).
34. 40 1(k) plans or cash or deferred arrangements are profit sharing plans that permit a
participant to defer a percentage of his earnings and contribute them to a plan where they are
allocated to his account. Hirsh, supra note 24, at 18. Employers often match participant
deferrals with employer matching contributions. Id. 401(k) plans are generally subject to
special nondiscrimination tests to prevent discrimination in favor of highly compensated
employees. See I.R.C. §§ 401(k)(3), (m)(2).
35. A money purchase pension plan is a defined contribution plan in which the
employer's contribution is not discretionary but fixed and determinable. Hirsh, supra note
24, at 19.
36. A target benefit plan is a type of money purchase pension plan which provides for a
theoretical or targeted pension benefit that will be payable at normal retirement age. Id. The
employer makes contributions each year to a fund for this benefit, and when a participant
terminates employment, he is entitled to the amount in his account. Id.
37. A stock bonus plan is almost identical to a profit-sharing plan except that
distributions of benefits are generally made in the form of employer stock. Id. However, a
participant may require the employer to purchase the stock if it is not readily tradable on an
established market. Id.
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employee stock ownership plans ("ESOP").38
3. Hybrid Plans
A hybrid plan combines the characteristics of both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans, but is classified as neither.39
The cash balance plan is a type of hybrid that has become increasingly
popular in recent years. 40 It is a defined benefit plan that resembles a
defined contribution plan in many ways. 4' In a cash balance plan, each
participant has a hypothetical account, the retirement benefit is expressed in
terms of a lump sum, and the account is credited with a specified rate of
interest not related to actual trust earnings. 4' The account exists for
bookkeeping purposes only, allowing employees to track the current value
of their accrued benefits.43 Employers make regular credits (typically a
percentage of salary) to employee's accounts, as well as "interest" credits
(which may be tied to a specific index) on a plan-specified basis. 44 In
addition, "as is the case with all defined benefit plans, the retirement
benefits in cash balance plans are guaranteed by the employer and by the
[Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] .
B.

The Choice of Plans

Employers often seek to manage their workforce as well as provide
financial security for retirees, through employer-sponsored pension plans.46
The availability of multiple pension plan designs provides employers with
a better opportunity to reach these goals. Employers should compare the
advantages and disadvantages of defined-benefit versus definedcontribution plans before deciding which will be most appropriate and
beneficial for all. Additionally, employers must consider which particular

38. ESOP is a stock bonus plan, or a combination of a stock bonus plan and a money
purchase plan, which is designated to invest primarily in the common stock of the employer.
Id.
39. Regina T. Jefferson, Symposium: Striking a Balance in the Cash Balance Plan
Debate, 49 BuFF. L. REv. 513, 518 (2001).
40. It was first implemented in the mid-1980s and has gained attention recently as
employers have converted their traditional pension plans into cash balance plans. Elizabeth
E. Drigotas, Cash Balance Plans: An Overview, 16 TAX MGMT. FIN. PLAN. J. 115, 115
(2000).
41. Jefferson, supra note 39, at 519 (It "has many of the features of a defined
contribution plan, but in reality is a defined benefit plan.").
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Scott, supra note 23, at 35.
45. Jefferson, supra note 39, at 519.
46. See CONISON, supra note I, at 31 (discussing the economic aspects of plans).
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versions of plans within the larger categories will suit their business needs
and provide employees with a competitive benefits package.
Under a defined benefit plan, the eligible participating employee has
the right to a specified monthly income for life, and the employer bears the
investment risk of the fund. ERISA provides for the establishment of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") to administer an
insurance scheme aimed at providing "timely and uninterrupted payment of
pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries" under these plans.47 The
employer must pay premiums to PBGC to insure against any benefits lost,
and also must make up for any funding deficiency at the time of
The reporting and compliance requirements and the
distribution. 4'
necessity of plan administration may subject the sponsor of a defined
benefit plan to additional administrative costs. However, from the
employees' perspective (especially those who are unsophisticated
investors), the security that a defined benefit plan offers makes this type of
plan a desirable retirement savings vehicle.49
In contrast, under a defined contribution plan, the employer fulfills its
funding obligation by making an annual lump sum payment to the plan
while placing the ultimate investment risk on employees. Participating
employees are less secure under defined contribution plans, but these plans
are less costly to employers than defined benefit plans. For example,
employers can save insurance premiums and other administrative costs.
Although for many types of defined contribution plans the funding is less
flexible than for a defined benefit plan, more and more employers are
adopting defined contribution plans as the primary savings vehicle for
employee retirement benefits. Employees may favor a defined contribution
plan over a defined benefit plan for several additional reasons. First, a
defined contribution plan has a simpler formula; it is much easier to
understand than the formula for a defined benefit plan, which requires
employers to calculate the present value of the monthly benefit that an
employee expects to receive at retirement. Second, employees may benefit
from smart investment decisions. Finally, the employees can change jobs
without risking significant reductions in their accrued benefits, which may
occur with a defined benefit plan.5 °
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2).
48. See id. § 1307 (setting the deadline for premium payment to pension benefit
guaranty corporations).
49. Michael J.Collins, Reviving Defined Benefit Plans: Analysis and Suggestions for

Reform, 20 VA. TAX REV. 599, 600 (2001).
50. This feature has been considered especially appealing in today's labor market where
people change their jobs more often than in the past. See Jefferson, supra note 39, at 514;
see also, Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Day 2000 - 10 Workforce Facts, 2000
available at http://www.dol.gov/ocianews/September-2000/labor-day-2000 fun-facts.htm
("The average person in the U.S. holds 9.2 jobs from age 18 to age 34. More than half of
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Since Congress passed ERISA in 1974, private employers have
gradually been shifting the mode of primary employee pension plans from
defined benefit to defined contribution plans. 51 For employers that do
maintain defined benefit plans, more and more have converted their
traditional format to hybrid plans, such as the cash balance plans.52
III. PROBLEMS OF THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
Private retirement system legislation targets three major concerns:
pension coverage, security of benefits, and tax expenditure cost. These
three areas are often closely related.
A. Pension Coverage
Although the government's tax expenditure on private pension plans
increases each year, pension coverage has been stagnant and has fallen
behind labor force growth in the 1990s." Since the decision to sponsor
private pension plans by employers is entirely voluntary, the coverage of
such plans is often affected by people's employment patterns.
"A
Government Accounting Office (GAO) report found a majority of persons
without pension coverage had at least one of the following characteristics:
low income, part-time employment, employment at small firms, or
youth. 54 Professor Bernstein observed that the shrinking coverage had
these jobs were held between the ages of 18 and 24.").
51. See Jefferson, supra note 39, at 514 n.1 (explaining that ERISA completely revised
the legal framework for qualified pension plans); Collins, supra note 49, at 601 ("[W]hile
defined contribution plans continue to become more popular, defined benefit plans have
experienced a marked decline in the past 15 years outside the governmental and collectively
bargained sectors."); Fact Sheet: Changes in the Private Employment Based Pension and
Health Systems (Sept. 1999), at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/25splash.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2003) (indicating that from 1975 to 1996, pension plan participants, enrolled
only in a defined benefit plan, declined from sixty-eight percent to nineteen percent,
whereas those enrolled in only a defined contribution plan increased from thirteen percent to
fifty percent and those enrolled in both types of plans increased from nineteen percent to
thirty-one percent.)
52. See Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 5 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating "[iln recent
years, at least 325 companies, with more than $330 billion in pension-defined benefit assets,
have adopted cash-balance plans. This changeover is the biggest development in the pension
world in years" and listing IBM, AT&T, CitiGroup, Bell Atlantic, SBC Communications,
CIGNA Corp., AETNA, Eastman Kodak, and CBS among the most notable companies that
have converted to cash balance plans).
53. Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions: Itis Not Pretty (pt. 3), 5
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.351, 385 n. 88 (2001 ) (citations omitted).
54. See Pratt, supra note 33, at 746 n. 11(2001) (citing GEN. ACCT. OFF., PENSION
PLANS: CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS INTHE LABOR FORCE WITHOUT PENSION COVERAGE 4

(2000)("The GAO report found a strong correlation between having one or more of these
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been aggravated by the following factors: 1) increasing layoffs; 2) reclassifying full-time employers as independent contractors; and 3) shifting
workers from full-time to part-time positions. 5
Moreover, pension
coverage does not necessarily equal pension benefits. Short-term
employees and young long-term employees who have cashed out their
small vested benefits are likely to be the losers. 56
Small employers, with notably lower rates of plan participation, 57 have
naturally been the focus of private pension reforms. Congress has enacted
new types of defined contribution plans that are intended for use by small
employers: employer-sponsored individual retirement accounts (IRAs),"
simplified employee pension plans (SEPs),5 9 salary reduction SEPs
(SARSEPs), 60 SIMPLE IRAs, 61 SIMPLE 401(k) plans, 62 and safe harbor

401(k) plans. 63 Unfortunately, these new types of plans have been so far
ineffective in increasing pension coverage by small employers. 64 Perhaps,
traits and either not wanting coverage or being unable to save for retirement.").
55. Id. (citing American Academy of Actuaries, Policy Monograph 1998 No. 1,
Financingthe Retirement of Future Generations: The Problems and Optionsfor Change 1,
10 (1998), availableat http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/retirement.pdf (finding that "[i]n
both the public and private sectors, there is a major difference in coverage between parttime and full-time employees. Only twelve percent of part-time workers in the private
sector participate in pension plans, versus fifty percent of full-time workers").
56. See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 386-87 (arguing that increased pension coverage
does not mean more people will receive pension benefits).
57. See Small Employer Retirement Survey, The 2001 Small Employer Retirement
Survey
(SERS)
Summary
of
Findings
1
(2001),
available
at
http://www.ebri.org/sers/2O0l/Olserses.pdf[hereinafter SERS] (stating that seventy-nine
percent of full-time employees at employers with more than 100 workers were covered by
one or more employment-based retirement plans in 1997, whereas in 1996, only forty-six
percent of full-time workers in small private establishments were covered by a retirement
plan)(citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Employee Benefits in
Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1997, Bulletin 2517. (1999), and BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Employee Benefits in Small Private
Establishments, 1996, Bulletin 2507 (1999)).
58. See I.R.C. § 408(c) (requiring that employer-created trusts made for the exclusive
benefit of employees must be treated as an IRA).
59. See id. § 408(k) (defining simplified employee pension plans and their treatment in
the tax code).
60. See id. § 408(k)(6) (describing the election of salary reduction plans).
61. See id. § 408(p) (defining simple retirement accounts and their treatment in the tax
code).
62. See id. § 401(k)(l 1) (requiring that all simple plans meet nondiscrimination
requirements).
63. See id. § 401(k)(12) (listing alternative methods to meeting nondiscrimination
requirements). In addition, Roth 401(k) plans and Roth 403(b) plans have been added to the
mix by EGTRRA effective in 2003. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16 § 617, 115 Stat. 38.
64. SERS, supra note 57, at 4 (noting that among the surveyed employers that refuse to
sponsor retirement plans, fifty-two percent of them have never heard of SEPs and an
additional sixteen percent have heard of them, but are not too familiar with them. Thirtyfour percent have never heard of SIMPLE plans-plans created by Congress specifically for
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since each of these plans is subject to a different set of rules, their
complexity has effectively prevented small employers from adopting
them. 6' However, there are additional reasons that have likely contributed
to small employers' hesitancy to offer plan coverage.6 6 In 2001, the Small
Employer Retirement Survey suggested a list of items that may incentivize
small employers to increase plan coverage.
These items included
increasing the company's profits, reducing low administrative costs and
requirements, eliminating employer contribution requirements, and offering
61
additional business tax credits.
Women, as an important subgroup of the larger workforce, suffer even
more from low pension coverage. 6' This is because women are more likely
to work in part-time jobs that do not qualify for coverage, or to work fewer
years in pension-covered employment because of interruptions in their
careers. 69 Nevertheless, retirement income may be even more critical for
women than for men because they have a longer life expectancy.7 °
Minorities also face special challenges for retirement savings. As of
1999, compared to forty-seven percent of Caucasians working in the
private sector participating in pension plans, only forty-one percent of
African Americans, thirty-eight percent of Asian and Pacific Islanders, and
twenty-seven percent of Hispanic-Americans participate in such plans.
B.

Pension Security
While more and more employers have shifted from a defined benefit

plan to a defined contribution plan, participating employees face increased
risk because defined contribution plans allow individual plan participants to

small employers-and thirteen percent are not too familiar with them. Surprisingly, many
nonsponsors are also not familiar with more traditional pension or deferred profit-sharing
plans. By comparison, very few of them say they have never heard of or are not too familiar
with 401(k) plans).
65. Pratt, supra note 33, at 746-47.
66. In fact, the Small Employer Retirement Survey in 2001 found that while cost and
administrative issues play a role, they might not be the main obstacles to plan sponsorship.
SERS, supra note 57, at 3.
67. Id. at 6-7.
68. According to the Department of Labor's Employee Benefits Supplements to the
Current Population Survey of 1999, the pension coverage rate in 1999 for women was forty
percent and forty-seven percent for men. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Coverage Status of Workers
Under Employer Provided Pension Plans, at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/opr/CWSSurvey/hilites.html#footI.
69. U.S.
DEP'T
OF
LABOR,
Women
and Retirement
Savings,
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/women.html.
70. Id. ("On average, a female retiring at age 55 can expect to live another 27 years,
four years longer than a male retiring at the same age, and needs to save for these extra
years.")
71. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 68.
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make investment decisions. Defined benefit plans, on the other hand, rely
on investment decisions made by professional asset managers. In
addition, under defined contribution plans, employees lose the protection of
ERISA's fiduciary standards and PBGC's insurance.73 As a result,
retirement plans are providing employees with less protection overall,
especially those with low incomes or who are unsophisticated investors.74
Women and minorities are likely to suffer more than other workforce
subgroups. Studies have shown that women (especially Caucasian women)
and minorities are disparately impacted by self-directed defined
contribution plans because they tend to invest more conservatively than
Caucasian males.75
Will better investment education help improve pension security? The
effect will likely be limited.76 Professor Stabile suggests that employees
are not an easy group to educate. 77 Also, the job of an investment manager
is a difficult one. Moreover, with respect to over-investment in employer
securities, education is unlikely to be even minimally effective because
such decisions are often based on emotional factors like loyalty. Even
financially sophisticated employees, who well understand the dangers of
excessive investment in a single stock, may tend to over-invest in employer
securities due to these emotional factors. 8

72. Susan J. Stabile, Paternalism Isn't Always a Dirty Word: Can the Law Better
Protect Defined Contribution Plan Participants?5 EMPLOYEE RTS & EMP. POL'Y J. 491,
498 (2001).
73. Id. at 501-503.
74. In the fastest growing type of defined contribution plan (the 401(k) plan) because
contributions are often made on behalf of only those employees who elect to participate,
low-paid employees who are covered exclusively by such plans but who cannot afford to
make contributions, often receive little or no benefits when they retire. Jefferson, supra
note 39, at 516.
75. See Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Investment Without Education: The DisparateImpact
on Women and Minorities in Self-Directed Defined Contribution Plans, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 223, 238-41 (2001) (summarizing studies that indicate why women are more
conservative investors); See also, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 69 ("Studies indicate
that women tend to invest more conservatively than men, receiving lower rates of return
from their investment over time, thus reducing the amount of savings they have at
retirement.").
76. Empirical evidence suggests that education has not been effective despite the efforts
by employers and the Department of Labor. See Colleen E. Medill, The Individual
Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49
EMORY L.J. 1, 20 (2000) (evaluating a study by the Employee Benefits Research Institute
whose results showed a failure of 401(k) plan participants to invest their plan assets despite
their access to employer-run investment education programs).
77. Stabile, supra note 72, at 504.
78. Id. at 505.
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Tax-Expenditure Cost

While tax benefits have been the primary means for the legislature to
encourage the sponsorship of private pension plans, the distribution of
these benefits often raises serious issues of equity. Many have argued that
although the tax expenditure cost to the government on private pension
plans has been significant, the tax subsidies actually flow mostly to those
who are already better off. Highly paid corporate officers and executives
are most likely to enjoy plan coverage and are most capable of making the
maximum contribution to their pension plans. Therefore, these individuals
receive the greatest tax benefits from their retirement investment. 9 The tax
costs burden all taxpayers;80 nevertheless, those who need pension income
the most (i.e., low-income workers) and whose conditions have justified
those tax incentives, could end up with only a minor percentage of the
benefits, if they receive any at all.
IV. THE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF
2001: A CRITICAL EVALUATION
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
81 includes over forty provisions affecting pension plans and
(EGTRRA),
benefits. "Most of these provisions are designed to encourage the
expansion of retirement
• • ,,12 savings and to reduce the complexity of existing
In an effort to reform the retirement benefit system,
statutory provisions.
EGTRRA has sacrificed almost fifty billion dollars of tax revenues on
private pension plans and individual retirement arrangement, including
more than twenty billion dollars for expanding pension coverage." A
question still remains as to how well EGTRRA addressed the problems and
concerns of the pension coverage and pension security systems. This
section will evaluate the major retirement plan provisions of EGTRRA
from this perspective.
Increased Contributionand Benefit Limits

A.

The tax law imposes limits on: 1) contributions and benefits under
79. See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 386; See also, Pamela Perun, The Limits of Saving,

49 BUFF. L. REV. 873, 903-04 (stating that low-income savers are often left behind by a
private pension system which is "based solely on tax system incentives and subsidies.").
80. Bernstein, supra note 53, at 386.
81.

EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).

82. Committee on Employee Benefits, Employee Benefits, 55 TAX
2002)(summarizing EGTRRA provisions on employee benefits).

LAW.

1093 (summer

83. Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1876, EGTRRA

Conference Report (May 26, 2001).
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qualified plans; 2) the amount of compensation that may be taken into
account under a plan for determining benefits; and 3) the amount of
elective deferrals to limit the tax benefits associated with the qualified
84
plans.
With a primary focus on retirement plan contribution limits,
EGTRRA has extensively increased these maximum dollar amounts.
In 2002, the limit on compensation under a qualified plan increased
from $170,000 (as adjusted for 2001 under pre-EGTRRA law) to
$200,000.85
Elective deferral limits for defined contribution plans
(applicable to 401(k), 403(b), and 457 Plans) will be increased in stages
from $10,500 for 2001 to $15,000 for 2006 and thereafter. 86 Starting in
2002, elective deferral limits for a SIMPLE plan increased incrementally
by an additional $1,000 each year until 2005 .
In 2002, the annual maximum benefit from a defined benefit plan
increased from $140,000 to $160,000.88 The maximum annual contribution
to a defined contribution plan was increased from $35,000 to $40,000.89
The maximum percentage of compensation that can be contributed and
deducted by an employer (based on aggregate compensation of all
participants) to a profit-sharing plan, including SEPs, was increased from
fifteen percent to twenty-five percent. 9° Money purchase pension plans are
treated identically for purposes of the deduction rules. 9'
The tax burden forgiven by increasing these dollar limits will be
significant. The Committee Reports explain that the changes to the
contribution and benefit limits are aimed at increasing plan coverage:
One of the factors that may influence the decision of an
employer, particularly a small employer, to adopt a plan is the
extent to which the owners of the business, the decisionmakers,
or other highly compensated employees will benefit under the
plan. The Committee believes that increasing the dollar limits on

84. H.R. REP. No. 107-1836, T 5039 (2001).
85. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16 § 611(c), 115 Stat. 38. This will be indexed for

inflation in $5,000 increments, compared with the previous indexing of $10,000 increments.
Id.
86. See id. § 611(d) (charting the deferral limit increase from 2002 to 2006). The
$15,000 will be indexed for inflation after 2006 in $500 increments. Id. at § 61 l(d)(2) para.
5.
87. See id. § 617(f) (stating that these amendments will be enacted after December 31,
2005). The $10,000 regular contribution limitation will be index for inflation in $500
increments starting in 2006. Id.
88. See id. § 61 1(a) (describing the dollar limit changes for defined benefit plans).

89. See id. § 611 (b) (describing the dollar limit changes for defined contribution plans).
Before EGTRRA, indexing was in $5,000 increments. H.R. REP. No. 1909-1836, T 5039
(2001).
90. See id. § 616(a) (outlining the modification of deduction limits for stock bonus and
profit sharing trusts and defined contribution plans).
91. Id.
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qualified plan contributions and benefits will encourage
employers to establish qualified plans for their employees.
For employees already covered by a section 401(k) plan or other plans
that allow elective deferrals, the increased limits to the deferrals are
intended to better enable the employees to save for their retirement. 93
However, it remains unclear whether the tax incentives will produce the
intended improvement in pension coverage or whether the improvement, if
any, will be worth the promised expenditure once added to the political
expenses already incurred in connection with its enactment.94 Indeed,
whether raising the limits on contribution will actually improve individual
retirement savings through the private pension system is a "highly
controversial" issue. 95
This legislation promises most of its immediate benefits to:
employers, the highly compensated employees who control an employer's
retirement benefit decisions, and those employees already covered by a
pension plan and are earning enough to contribute to retirement savings
through the plan. The limit on recognized annual compensation of a plan
participant in determining the participant's benefits has been an important
measure to impose a ceiling on the benefits of very highly-compensated
employees. 96 The limit had risen to $235,840 before it was reduced to
$150,000 in 1993 to mitigate against a bias in favor of highly-paid
employees.97 Although some believe that the reduced limit has deterred
some employers from adopting qualified plans, it is at least doubtful that
employers' adoption of defined contribution plans, as compared to defined
benefit plans, has been deterred given the substantial increase in the
number of defined contribution plans in recent years. 9'
A study by Pamela Perun analyzing the likely impact of some reform
proposals which raised contribution and benefit limits (largely the same as
those changes adopted by EGTRRA) questioned such an approach even
before the enactment of EGTRRA. 99 Perun found that the reform proposals

92. H.R. REP.No. 107-51, at 63 (2001).
93. Id. at 70.
94. See Perun, supra note 79, at 903 (suggesting that from a political cost-benefit
perspective, the proposals do not attempt to make fundamental changes in the structure or
operation of the system and thus are not worth the political capital expended on them).
95. Id. at 874 (arguing that the reforms would do little to change the status quo in the
private pension system).
96. Collins, supra note 49, at 621.
97. Id. In Collins' view, the classification of this reduction as a "revenue raising
measure" under the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 revealed the true reason for the
change. Id.
98. Id. at 622.
99. Specifically, the proposals studied would make the following changes:
(1) standardize the contribution limits in 401(k), 403(b), and 457 plans; (2) raise
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would primarily benefit those individuals who wish to and are capable of
saving a large portion of their incomes, and that they would not increase
the average or marginal tax subsidies but may well decrease them.'00 She
also found that the reform proposals would increase the absolute dollar
amount received in tax subsidies, thus concluding that the primary effect
would be to help those who can afford to save more for retirement by doing
so with federal tax dollars.0 1
The effectiveness of the legislation is also limited by the inherent
defects of defined contribution plans.
Since these plans place the
investment risk upon participants, increased investment through defined
contribution plans does• •. not
necessarily optimize the retirement
102
accumulations of participants.
Unsophisticated rank-and-file employees
are more likely than other, more highly-paid employees, to end up with
sub-optimal retirement benefits.
Since the benefits under EGTRRA are available to all qualified plans,
and there is no added incentive for employers to adopt defined benefit
plans as their primary pension plan, any positive effect on sponsorship of a
defined benefit plan would be minimal.
For those employers already offering defined benefit plans and
considering a cash balance conversion, EGTRRA provides a partial
response to the debate over conversion. This will at least help prevent
more employers from withdrawing their offers to sponsor defined benefit
plans.
B.

Catch-up Contributionand Annual Benefit Limit Changes

For participants of defined contribution plans, taxpayers who are fifty
or older will be allowed to make additional contributions,'0 3 which "will
not be subject to anti-discrimination rules or other limitations, except that
contributions may not exceed earnings."' 4 The catch-up contributions to

the cap on compensation from $170,000 to $200,000; (3) over a five year
period, raise the dollar limit for contributions by employees in 401(k), 403(b),
and 457 plans to $15,000; (4) raise the compensation limit from 25% to 100%;
and (5) raise the limit on annual individual contributions from $30,000 to
$40,000.
Perun, supra note 79, at 879.
100. Id. at 903.
101. Id.
102. Stabile, supra note 72, at 492-93.
103. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 631(a), 115 Stat. 38, 111 (2001).
104. Gary S. Lesser & William A. Clemmer, EGTRRA, EGTRRA, Read All About It,
ROUGH NOTES, Aug. 1, 2001, at http://www.roughnotes.com/rnmag/augustO1/. For instance,
an employee who is over age 50 could contribute an extra $1,000 even though other plan
provisions may limit the 401(k) contribution, for instance, to $6,500.
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various types of defined contribution plans for these individuals may have
some positive effects on the pension coverage of older workers. The
Committee Reports explain the rationale for the catch-up contributions
provision:
Although the Committee believes that individuals should be
saving for retirement through their working lives, as a practical
matter, many individuals simply do not focus on the amount of
retirement savings they need until they near retirement. In
addition, many individuals may have difficulty saving more in
earlier years, e.g., because an employee leaves the workplace to
care for a family. Some individuals may have a greater ability to
save as they near retirement. The Committee believes that the
pension laws should assist individuals who are nearing retirement
to save more for their retirement.'0 5
Another potential effect of the catch-up contribution provision is that
older workers covered by a defined contribution plan may be encouraged to
delay retirement. °6 Postponed retirement helps older workers save more.
The catch-up provisions may potentially have a negative impact as
well. Allowing catch-up contributions for every worker who has attained
fifty years of age instead of providing for those who are in danger of
having inadequate retirement income may increase the distributional
Also, such a provision
inequities of the pension tax law system.'0 7
encourages misconceptions "among younger workers that they do not need
to begin ' saving large amounts for retirement until later in their working
careers." 108
In addition, EGTRRA reduces the limit on annual benefits paid out of
a defined benefit plan for retirement before age sixty-two instead of the
pre-EGTRRA age of sixty-five.' 0 9 This may discourage some workers
between the ages of sixty-two and sixty-five who are covered by a defined
benefit plan, from remaining in the labor force and saving for retirement."0
C.

Plan Administrationand Simplifications

105. H.R. REP. No. 107-51, at 70 (2001).
106. See Jonathan Barry Forman, How Federal Pension Laws Influence Individual Work
and Retirement Decisions, 54 TAX LAW. 143, 145 (2000)(arguing that the pension system is
"fraught with financial incentives that push able-bodied elderly workers into retirement just
when instead they should be encouraged to remain in the work force to accumulate
additional retirement assets" and suggesting that a rule that permits older workers to accrue
additional benefits for each additional year of service might help expand pension coverage).
107. Colleen E.Medill, Targeted Pension Reform, 27 J. LEGIS. 1,41 (2001).
108. Id.
109. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 611 (a), 115 Stat. 38, 96 (2001).
110. See Forman, supra note 106, at 180 (indicating that although the benefit reduction
for taking benefits prior to age sixty-five is considered actuarially fair, empirical research
suggests that the Social Security earnings test slightly discourages labor supply).
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A series of miscellaneous provisions under EGTRRA can help
simplify and reduce the costs of plan administration, thus providing better
protection to employee participants.
Small employers are entitled to a fifty percent (up to $500) credit for
their pension start-up costs incurred during each of the first three years of
the plan (beginning after December 31, 2001)."' In addition, after 2001,
for the plan's first five years, a small employer may waive the user fees
charged by the IRS for the determination letter issued to establish qualified
plan status." 2 In 2001, the fees ranged from $125 to $1,250."'
The distinction between 401(k)/profit sharing, 403(b) plans, and
governmental 457 plans is further blurred by the ability to commingle
assets, 1 4 making it easier for employees to move from for-profits to
nonprofits and/or government employment." 5 The ability to rollover assets
between various plans further simplifies the system and provides an
incentive for individuals to continue to accumulate funds for retirement." 6
In 2003, Roth 401(k) and Roth 403(b)" 7 plans became available to provide
participants with more choices.'"
A faster vesting schedule applies for employers who match
contributions for plan years beginning in 2002.'"9 Thus, matching
contributions in a 401(k) plan must become fully available to the plan
participant after three years of service (or six years, if the employer
12
The vesting schedule used to be five and
contributions vest gradually).
..
• 121
This provision was inserted to allow many
seven years, respectively.
lower and middle-income employees to "take full advantage of the
retirement savings opportunities provided by their employer's section
EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 619, 115 Stat. 38, 109 (2001).
11I.
112. See id. § 620 (allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to waive user fees for eligible
employers).
113. H.R. REP. No. 107-51, at 70.
114. See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16 §§ 641-643, 115 Stat. at 118-23 (addressing
rollovers among various plans, of IRAs, and after-tax contributions): Id. at §§ 646
(rationalizing restrictions on distributions); Id. at § 649 (specifying minimum distribution
and inclusion requirements for section 457 plans); Id. at § 666 (repealing the multiple-use
test).
115. Lesser & Clemmer, supra note 104.
116. But other changes also add complexity to the current system so that the overall
See Pratt, supra note 33, at 852-53
pension system is not significantly simplified.
(analyzing the complexity of changes to 403(b) plans, Roth contributions, ESOPs, as well as
401(k) plans).
117. Also called a tax-sheltered annuity or section 403(b) annuity.
118. EGTRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 617, 115 Stat. at 103-06.
119. See id. § 633(a), 115 Stat. at 115-16.
120. Id.
121. H.R. REP. No. 107-51, at 73-74 (2001) (discussing section 303 of H.R. 10, the
Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act of 2001).
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401(k) plan," to "make section 401(k) plans more attractive," and to
"enable

short-service

employees

to

accumulate

greater retirement
savings."'
These miscellaneous incentives, however modest, are constructive
moves toward the improvement of pension coverage and security. The
simplification of plans and the reduction of administrative costs may
encourage small employers to sponsor new employee pension plans. Faster
vesting schedules help short-term employees to take advantage of pension
saving opportunities. Easier asset rollover between various plans also
encourages people with mobile employment patterns to save more for their
retirement. These changes target those employees whose employment
patterns have disadvantaged them in taking advantage of private pension
plans, and (to the extent that their employment patterns have caused the
disparate impact) may serve to improve the retirement benefit conditions of
women and minorities in the workforce.
As suggested above, many factors have contributed to the low pension
coverage of these subgroups. Response to any single factor might not
achieve a significant effect. However, it is still commendable to respond to
some identified problems in the private pension system.
122

V.

REFORM PROPOSALS

Professor Bernstein believes that a lack of awareness of serious
13
structural problems in private pension plans makes reform unlikely.
Employers' interests are expected to dominate under the structure of
employer-sponsored plans. 114
Admittedly, EGTRRA leaves many important issues unresolved.
First, private pension plans are still risky for unsophisticated employees,
especially in a slow economy, because EGTRRA gives more incentives for
defined contribution plans but little for defined benefit plans. Second,
significant tax benefits have gone to those who are already well-off in order
to encourage sponsorship of employee pension plans that are inevitably
dominated by employer interests.
However EGTRRA does respond to some hotly debated issues in the
private pension world, such as cash-balance conversions and smallemployer pension coverage problems. With the problems of various types
of pension plans becoming more obvious, a review of some of the current
reforms may direct future reforms after EGTRRA.

122. Id. at 73.
123. Bernstein, supra note 53, at 389 (concluding that the lack of awareness of structural
problems within employer-sponsored plans will make reform unlikely).
124. Id.
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Choice of Plans and Plan Reforms

With the trend moving away from defined benefit plans and toward
defined contribution plans, many are advocating for a more diversified
coverage of pension plans, as "[a] sound retirement policy would
encourage employers to sponsor both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans for their employees because, in combination, the plans
can help provide adequate income for employees' retirement years."'2 5
L Reviving Defined Benefit Plans
Because of the income security offered by a defined benefit plan and
the marked decline of such plans in recent years, more incentives should be
proffered for continued sponsorship of defined benefit plans.
Professor Collins has proposed increasing the compensation limit of
defined benefit plans, which he believes would directly and favorably
impact the decisionmakers, i.e., highly compensated employees with
authority to adopt defined benefit plans, which are preferable to defined
contribution plans in terms of pension security and will benefit those
employees earning between the old and new compensation limits. 16
Noting that "unnecessary complexity and poorly thought-out rules
have deterred many employers, especially small employers, from adopting
defined benefit plans, and also have been a major factor in the termination
of thousands of defined benefit plans over the past 15 years,"'2 7 Collins
suggests simplifying the rules and creating employer incentives in order to
revive defined benefit plans so that coverage of such plans and the current
form of the qualified plan regime can be substantially improved."'
However, simplification of rules is "simpler to state than to
achieve."' 2 9 Alternatively, adopting hybrid plans can be a better way to
revive defined benefit plans, which may capture the best features of both
and distribute investment risk between the sponsor and its employees.
Cash-balance pension plans are a viable option because they "combine the
portability and simplicity of defined contribution plans with the
predictability and security of traditional defined benefit plans."' 3
125. Collins, supra note 49, at 601.

126. Id. at 622.
127. id. at 656. Collins also points out that those complicated rules were adopted often
for revenue-driven reasons.
128.
largely
129.
130.

Id. at 602. ("[T]his article assumes that the qualified plan regime will be retained
in its current form.").
Pratt, supra note 33, at 752.
Jefferson, supra note 39, at 573.
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The conversion from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash
balance plan has been controversial. The traditional defined benefit plan is
heavily back loaded. That is, the benefit is based on average pay
immediately prior to retirement, whereas a cash balance plan allocates a
fixed percentage of compensation to each worker's hypothetical account
each year.13 The traditional defined benefit plan encourages employees to
work for a single employer until retirement and creates incentives for
employers to encourage early retirement, whereas the cash balance plan is
neutral as to employees' retirement decisions.1
Because of these different features between the two types of plans,
"[o]lder participants may be disadvantaged under the cash balance plan
design. This is true for both converted and unconverted cash balance
plans. 1 33 First, replacing a traditional pension plan with a cash balance
plan might significantly reduce the expected pension benefits of older
workers. Some of them may also experience a "wear-away period," which
"prevents employees from accruing new benefits under a converted cash
balance plan until the accruals in the cash balance accounts exceed the
31 4
value of the benefits already accrued under the prior accrual formula."'
Second, the disproportionate impact on older workers within different age
groups due to the elimination or reduction of early retirement benefits
offered under the prior plan further complicates the situation with age
discrimination concerns."'

Due to all of these uncertainties about cash balance conversions, some
employers are deterred from adopting cash balance plans. 136 While some
commentators call for congressional clarification to clear the path for cash
balance plans,' 37 a compromise has also been suggested: strike a balance
between the interests of employers and employees by:

131. See supra notes 28 and 36 and accompanying text in II.A.1 and II.A.3 for a
discussion of defined benefit plan and cash balance plans.
132. Forman, supra note 106, at 156 (discussing how defined contribution plans can
effect employee retirement timing).
133. See Jefferson, supra note 39, at 538.
134. Id. at 546.
135. Id. at 546-47. Opponents of the plan argue that the conversion for violating the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") is a matter of law. Proponents of the plan
argue that the conversion will not violate ERISA or ADEA because the employer-provided
pension system is only voluntary. Moreover, if an employer does provide a pension plan to
the employees, ERISA generally ensures that the employees will receive the benefits that
the employer has promised them. Jonathan B. Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance
Pension Plan Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 379, 383 (2000). See Stabile, supra
note 72 , 511-12 (noting that the conversion of defined benefit plans to cash balance plans
raises two concerns, the "wear-away" issue and age discrimination). See generally, Edward
A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683 (2000).

136. Collins, supra note 49, at 651.
137. Id. at 652.
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(1) requiring that employers who convert their traditional defined
benefit plans to cash balance plans provide sufficient notice to
affected plan participants regarding the impact of the change on
their projected retirement benefits; and (2) limiting the amounts
by which the retirement benefit
• of affected
•
138 plan participants can
be reduced as a result of plan conversions.
EGTRRA has adopted the notice approach, thus endorsing more
adoption of cash balance plans in the future. The Act requires meaningful
disclosure concerning a plan amendment that provides for a "significant
reduction in the rate of future benefit accrual," including any elimination or
reduction of an early retirement benefit or retirement-type subsidy. 31409
Section 659 of the Act imposes an excise tax on the failure to disclose.
The Committee believes that this can "strike a balance between providing
meaningful disclosure and avoiding the imposition of unnecessary
administrative costs on employers.''
The Committee reports also note
that issues, particularly with respect to "wear-away" situations,
will be
142
Congress.
to
guidance
provide
to
Treasury
the
by
studied
further
2.Reforming Defined Contribution Plans
A major issue for any reform of defined contribution plans will likely
be simplification of the rules. The current complex rules have likely
hindered small employers from adopting pension plans for their
employees. 143 Professor Pratt proposed to eliminate the unnecessary
differences between the rules applicable to different plans and to simplify
the rules for all defined contribution plans. This would relieve current plan
sponsors of the severe compliance burdens and encourage small employers
to start new plans for their employees.' 44 Although EGTRRA has made
some efforts to simplify the existing rules, 45 it simultaneously complicates
others. 146 The government is still working to simplify these rules. The
138. Jefferson, supra note 39, at 574.
139. H.R. REP. No. 107-51, at 95 (2001).
140. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 659, 115 Stat. 137 (2001).
141. H.R. REP. No. 107-51, at 95-96.
142. Id.
143. See Pratt, supra note 33, at 746-48 (illustrating the complexity of the rules and
citing from the 2000 Small Employer Retirement Survey the factors most likely to influence
a small employer to start a plan as an increase in profits (sixty-nine percent), a tax credit for
starting a plan (sixty-five percent), a plan with reduced administrative requirements (fiftytwo percent), and availability of easy-to- understand information (fifty percent)).
144. Id. at 851.
145. Examples of these efforts are: the portability provisions affecting 401(k)/profit
sharing, 403(b) plans, and governmental 457 plans.
146. See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 33, at 851-853 (differentiating between the EGTRRA
changes that promote simplification and those that add complexity).
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Treasury Department announced on January 31, 2003 that the President
proposes replacing 401(k) accounts with Employer Retirement Savings
Accounts (ERSAs), which would consolidate 401(k), thrift, 403(b), and
governmental 457 plans as well as SARSEPs and SIMPLE IRAs into a
streamlined147 and simpler account, and which could be sponsored by any
employer.
Simplification of rules, however, is not enough. Expanded coverage
of defined contribution plans does not necessarily mean that plan
participants will retire with sufficient plan benefits. The lack of pension
security under current defined contribution plans, calls for further
reforms. 48 Professor Stabile proposes that Congress should consider
whether ERISA should be amended to eliminate participant direction of
investments in 401(k) plans. 149 As a supplement to the elimination of
participant direction, the employer-sponsors should be required to provide
some minimum guaranteed level of benefits, or as Professor Jefferson has
proposed, to create an insurance scheme under ERISA for defined
contribution plans similar to that which exists for defined benefit plans. 50
In essence, Professor Stabile has proposed another type of hybrid plan. It is
a defined contribution plan with a defined benefit plan's security features,
and like a cash balance plan, possesses the best features of both types of the
traditional plans.
B.

Creating Right Incentives-TargetedPension Reform

Professor Medill's targeted pension reform proposal provides
inspiration beyond the modification of specific plans. She notes that the
federal budget balancing process has produced cycles in pension tax law
reforms:
In periods of budget deficits, pension tax law becomes more
Icomplex' as Congress amends the laws to reduce the amount of
the pension tax subsidy. These amendments, inscrutable except
to relatively few pension tax law experts, are in effect hidden,
and thus politically palatable, tax increases. Conversely, in times
of budget surplus the political debate over tax cuts naturally
147. Press Release, Rick Meigs, Publisher, 401khelpcenter.com, President Proposes
Replacing
401k
Plans
(Jan.
31,
2003)
at
http://www.40khelpcenter.conpress/prtreasury-013103.html
(on
file
with
401khelpcenter.com).
148. See Stabile, supra note 72, at 510-17 ("A major source of concern with defined
contribution plans is participant direction of investments, combined with the inability of
ERISA's fiduciary standards to meaningfully address participant direction.") Id. at 513.
149. Id. at513-14.
150. Id. at 515-16 (citing Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking The Risk of Defined
ContributionPlans,4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 682 (2000)).
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extends to the pension tax laws, but often masquerades under the
rubric of pension 'simplification' or 'fairness.'
EGTRRA seems to follow this traditional approach in times of budget
surplus."' It possesses all the three themes Professor Medill has identified
in the pension law surplus cycle: "administrative simplification, special
incentives based solely on employer size, and increased incentives for
individual retirement savings."' 53 Accordingly, such a reform would be
unlikely to expand retirement plan coverage to workers who currently have
none, but would enhance the benefits of highly-compensated employees
who already have coverage. "Draining the fisc is likely to exaggerate the
cyclical effects5 4of the budget balancing process on pension tax law policy
in the future."'
Professor Medill's proposal utilizes two general approaches:
1) by developing legislation that strategically target the pension
tax expenditure toward broadening the coverage base rather than
increasing the tax-subsidized retirement benefits available to
highly compensated employees; and (2) by focusing legislative
attention on obstacles to and incentives for new plan sponsorship
that are the least susceptible to budgetary cycles.
Specifically, to broaden the coverage base, unlike EGTRRA's
approach of increasing the limitations rules for qualified plans, the targeted
reform would "amend the coverage and eligibility rules governing qualified
plans to require more comprehensive coverage of the employer's
workforce" thus resulting in "retirement plan coverage for more rank-andfile employees.' 56 The tax incentive under targeted reform would result in
a more equitable pension tax law system that primarily benefits people in
lower income brackets.' 57
The targeted reform proposes three methods for encouraging the
sponsorship of new plans: 1) simplification of administrative procedures; 2)
increased market efficiency; and 3) education of employers.
First, administrative procedures should be adequately simplified to
truly simplify plan administration, and proposals that "masquerade under
the rubric of simplification," but "actually serve to redistribute a larger
share of the pension tax subsidy to higher-income employees" should be
rejected.' 58
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Medill, supra note 107, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 66.
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Second, promoting a more efficient market for plan administrative
services, which would produce longer-lasting incentives to plan
sponsorship than the one-time only tax credits currently available to
smaller employers.15 9
Third, stimulating employee demand through effective public
education, 160 as opposed to increasing tax benefits for high-ranking
employees in order to induce new plan sponsorships.
VI. CONCLUSION

A sound retirement benefit system that will provide sufficient
retirement income to the increasingly aging workforce is crucial to the
public welfare and to the maintenance of social stability in the United
States.
EGTRRA provides significant tax benefits to employers and
employees by increasing the limits of contributions and benefits to
encourage the sponsorship of new pension plans. Nevertheless, to the
extent that it follows the same pattern of reform traditionally enacted when
the country experiences a tax surplus, most of the tax monies will probably
flow to those who are already wealthy. This approach, unfortunately,
leaves many of those most in need of pension protection still outside the
system. EGTRRA also adopted changes to simplify pension administration
and reduce administrative costs for small employers. Congress continues
efforts to simplify the rules governing defined contribution plans in order to
encourage small employers to start plans for employees.
A review of the pension reform proposals suggests that, due to
significant differences in the investment risk allocation and the costs
associated with administering defined benefit plans versus defined
contribution plans, it is sound policy to encourage an employer to sponsor
both. Sponsoring both plans and giving employees a choice allows risks
and costs to be distributed equitably between employers and employees.
Alternatively, new hybrids that capture the best features of the two
traditional plans may be able to achieve the same goals.
In directing the future reform of the private pension system in the
United States, Congress should carefully design incentives and regulations
to efficiently and equitably achieve the national goal of sufficient
retirement income for all employees. Congress should look beyond its
traditional patterns of reform, which involve creating large scale financial
incentives. It should instead seek to adopt targeted reforms. Meanwhile, as
the "stick and carrot" in pension regulation, ERISA and the Internal
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Revenue Code should be amended together to ensure that tax incentives
will bring about the intended effects without being abused.

